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Three Wrong Leads in a Search for an Environmental Ethic:�
Ethic:
Tom Regan on Animal Rights, Inherent Values, and "Deep Ecology"
Ecology"�

In "Two Conceptions of an Envi
ronmental Ethic and Their Implica
tions" (this journal, IV/4, December,
1983), Evelyn PI u ha r has ex pertly and
meticulously explicated a basic dis
tinction in environmental ethics: that
of holism and individualism.
This
distinction may be as fundamental to
environmental ethics as is naturalism/
idealism to metaphysics,
rationalism/
empiricism to epistemology, and utili
ty/deontology to ethics.
As with
these other philosophical bifurcations,
I believe, as does Pluhar, that neither
holism or individualism can be suc
cessfully subsumed under the other in
a comprehensive and consistent envi
ronmental ethic. 1
In this essay, I
would like to examine critically one
attempt, that of Tom Regan, to artic
ulate an environmental ethic upon a
strongly
individualistic
foundation
namely, upon the concept of "rights
of
nature,"
which,
in
turn,
he
derives from a theory of "inherent
value."
Regan's attempt is impresive
in the scope of his enterprise, in the
clarity and eloquence of his language,
and in the subtlety and structure of
his argument.
For all that, I believe
that he fails to accomplish his objec
tives.
However, as is so often the
case, the lessons learned through
errors of this skillful philosophical
effort may prove to be of considerable
value to further investigation.
Early in

his book,

Therein, Regan writes:

All that Dwell

"I wanted to
provide vegetarianism with a moral
basis without resting it on extremely
controversial moral views. "2
Because
th isis sou nd strategy for a ph i loso
pher to adopt in defense of any posi
tion, it would be appropriate to ask
whether Regan has, in defending his
basic views on animal rights and

environmental ethics,
avoided "ex
tremely controversial" assumptions.
I
submit that he has not, but rather
that he has utilized, and failed to
defend effectively, th ree crucial yet
highly
controversial,
and
perhaps
untenable,
assumptions:
(a)
that
there are no morally significant dif
ferences between humans and other
animals; (b) that "inherent value," as
Regan defines it, is an intelligible
concept, and (c) that the views in
defense of "animal rights" presented
here are comp.atible with a "deep eco
logical"
approach
to
environmental
ethics.
These claims, I will argue,
are countered by a large and familiar
body of refuting arguments, highly
regarded and widely supported, both
within and beyond the philosophical
profession.
Regan's difficulties arise,
in large part, from his allegiance to
what Pluhar calls an "individualistic
conception of an environmental ethic."
Near the close of this essay, I will
suggest how many of these pitfalls
might be avoided through an accomo
dation of "individualism" and "holism"
in environmental ethics.

ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Rega n' s most recu r rent st rategy
for validating animal rights is to dem
onstrate that if human beings can be
said to have rights, some animals can
likewise be said to have rights.
(1)
This argument is based, in turn, on
the propositions that (a) human and
animal experiences and interests may
be "comparable" (8, 12, 86) or even
"equal" (31-2, 50, 86), (b) Human
and
animal
experiences
differ
in
degree but not in kind (159), and (c)
no traits that are universal among
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are exclusive to them (28,
36) . 3
Th re is a la rge body of pub
lished opinion that would deny (a)
and (b), and whi,ch would hold that
(c), though true, is unsupportive of
Regan s concl usion.
I

It is crucial, at the outset, to
point out that, in attempting to derive
animal
rights
though
an
analogy
between an imals and humans, Regan
fails to come to terms with the
strongest rival position:
namely, the
argument
that
so-called
"human
rights" attach, not to "humans" (a
biological category) but to "persons"
(a moral category) and "potential per
sons." (Pluhar repeats this error, on
pp. 111-2.) "Personhood" refers to a
set
of
capacities-self-conciou sness,
self-awareness, rationality, ability to
act on principle, etc.-which are poss
essed by most members of the species
homo sapiens , and, to the best ofou r
knowledge, by no other animals in a
remotely compa rable deg ree and ki nd.
This close (though imperfect) correla
tion between species and capacity-set
leads to the common, though strictly
incorrect,
term
"human
rights. "
Regan's analysis takes advantage of
this linguistic inaccuracy.
(The error
is also rampant in public discussions
of "the right to life" of fetuses.)
The
defender
of
"person-rights"
(rather
than
"human-rights")
will
have a much easier time responding to
Regan's arguments, for the simple
reason that he will readily accord
these rights to any nonhuman being
(animal, cybernetic, or extra-terres
trial)
shown
to
possess
personal
traits. However, this advocate would
claim, it is a simple empirical fact that
no such beings have yet been shown
to exist.
It does not follow from this analy
sis that nonhumans possess no rights
whatever.
Several philosophers have
argued that sentient animals have a
right to humane treatment. 4
How
ever, no animals can be said to have
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such "person-rights" as "freedom of
worship," or a "right to a college
education," simply because they have
no capacity to exercise such rights.
What, then, of so-called "marginal
cases" of human beings with only par
tial or potential person-traits?
As
with animals, they might be accorded
such rights as they have the capacity
to exercise.
Also, potential persons,
such as infants or temporarily coma
tose
i'ndividuals,
are
plausibly
accorded rights "in anticipation" of
later capacities. But again, personal
capacity, not species membersh ip, is
the key to such an analysis of rights.
Surely it is, to say the least, a prom
inent analysis among philosophers who
deal with this issue. s
Yet it is not
the approach adopted by Regan (or
Pluhar), who repeatedly writes of
"humans" (as a species) and only
rarely of "persons. "6
Why should "personhood" loom so
large in a philosophical analysis of
human and animal rights? Essentially
for these reasons: (a) the quality of
personal life, and of the experience
therein, may be fundamentally differ
ent from that of non-personal life; (b)
this qualitative difference is such that
personal life may be said to be richer,
more comprehensive, and more valua
ble to the person, than a life of a
non-personal being to that being; and
(c) "personhood" denotes a set of
capacities that appears to be exclusive
to the human species (a contingent
fact), though not universal thereto. 7
If these claims can be sustained, then
it follows that the rights of persons
(i.e., most humans) are both more
comprehensive and more stringent that
the rights of relevant non-persons
(i. e.,
some
animals).
This,
of
course,
is a conclusion to which
Regan strenuously objects.
Why, then, should personal life,
contrary to Regan's contention, be
qualitatively different? The key, most
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commentators
ag ree,
is
language,
defined, not as "sign communication,"
but as a syntactically structured sys
tem of significant symbols. 8 With lan
guage,
an
organism
is
able
to
respon d, not on Iy to menta I images of
objects of experience (a capacity per
haps attainable without language), but
also to types (abstractions), facts (as
propositions),
projections,
hypoth

eses,

time

frames,

argument

turns on his bed, grimaces and
sobs. We do not say "Ah, if
on Iy he cou Id sti II spea k, we
could give him something for
his pain.
As it is, ~ince he
ca n not spea k, there's noth i ng
we need give him.
For he
feels no pain." We say he is
in pain, despite his loss of the
ability to say so. (6-7)

forms,

and moral principles.
Fu rthermore,
all this and more can, through gram
mar, be combined and structured in
an
inexhaustible variety of ways.
Fin a II y , t h ro ugh Ia n g u age, 0 n e may
acquire a self-concept, and view one
self as a n entity conti n u i ng th roug h
time.
In view of all this, Regan's treat
ment of "the language difference" is
remarkably restrictive.
Though the
poi nt of view out I i ned above has been
extensively and recently argued by
philosophers (such as Mead, Dewey,
Cassi rer , Langer, Wittgenstei n) and
many linguists,
psychologists,
and
anthropologists, Regan chooses instead
to take on Rene Descartes-and no one
else. (6-7) Regan writes: "one might
dispute the view that being able to
use a language is a necessary condi
tion of being a conscious being." (6)
Later he asserts: whether or not a
person is experiencing pain ... does
not depend on his being able to per
form one or another linguistic feat."
(7, cf. 32) However, by "linguistic
feat,"
Regan seems
to mean the
capacity to spea k or write-i. e., to
"produce" discourse.
He thus dis
misses "the linguistic difference:"

Imagine a person whose vocal
cords have been damaged to
such an extent that he no
longer has the ability to utter
words or even to make inarti
culate sounds, and whose arms
have been pa ralyzed so that he
cannot write, but who, when
his tooth abcesses, twists and

Here Regan attacks a position with
no adherents, and draws our attention
from a significant rival position.
Of
course, animals and language-deprived
humans can suffer pain, and may be
said to have a right not to endure
gratuitous pain.
However, paralyzed
humans who cannot "perform linguistic
feats" may not be language-deprived,
since there may be a -g reat dea I
"goi ng on inside. "
Spea king and
writing, in fact, are not even the
most
significant
"linguistic feats."
They are, instead, the outward mani
festations of an inward accomplishment
which supports advanced thought-the
basis of uniquely personal (presum
ably human) experiences.
With
language and
person hood,
life-quality is transformed.
The life
and experiences of persons and of
non-persons are no longer "compara
ble;" they are "different in kind."
Regan would have us believe other
wise.
His defense of "animal rights,"
as we have noted, stands repeatedly
on the contention that human and ani
mal experiences might be regarded as
" compara bl'"
I " an d
e,
or even "
equa,
thus that human and animal "inter
ests" and "rights" mig ht be "eq ua I. "
Such a contention seems to rest upon;·
a presumption that human and animal
lives, like safe-deposit boxes contain
ing coins and notes of debit, are com
posed of discrete and transferable
iexperiential (and derivatively moral)
counters. But surely, this is not how
it is.
Because experiences are inter
active, organic,
and systemic,
an
"autobiography" is more thana sum of
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discrete sequential experiences.
Be
cause human experiences are contex
tual, they come out of an ongoing
life, and affect the future of that life.
Experiences which "happen to" a life-a
stubbed toe, a toothache, an unex
pected prize, etc., have sense, mean
ing, value, in the context of that life.
Thus the quality of a pleasure or pain
can not be assessed apart from the
quality of the life it happens "in" or
"to"-apart from the matrix of atti
tudes, expectations and evaluations
that make up that life.
Now if, as
Regan's argument seems to require,
the differences between human and
animal lives are simply matters of
degree (not kind, cf. 159) among iso
lated phenomenal bits,
then some
sense and use may be made of his
arguments by analogy.
Our account
of "personhood" seems to suggest,
however, that this position is radically
mistaken. Humans, qua persons, deal
with each other in conversation and
with themselves in thought, with and
th roug h concepts a rticu lated th roug h
syntactical
language.
They think
abstractly of themselves, of others, of
commu n ity, of time, of thei r past and
future, of concepts such as rationality
and of morality. As persons, humans
experience unique dimensions of men
tal and emotional pain; self-reproach,
dread of impending loss, regret for
abandoned projects, fear of death,
and such moral sentiments as guilt
and shame.
Persons also uniquely
enjoy such pleasu res as self- respect,
intellectual and creative accomplish
ment, patriotism, irony, humor and
pride.
In sum the transcending and
transforming fact that human beings
are persons gives them a moral con
siderability far beyond that of ani
mals.
Thus if we regard the human
condition of personhood seriously, tal k
of "comparability" or even "equality"
of experiences of animals and human
beings becomes unsupportable.
Having said all this, we must not
coast
off
the
deep
end.
In
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pa rticu la r, acknowledgment of these
significant differences does not entail
that animal experiences do not morally
"matter," and that gratuitous torture
of animals is not morally reprehensi
ble.
However different and even
unknowable animal pain may be, it is
pain nonetheless.
Furthermore, this
point of view need not be regarded as
"species chauvinism." If homo sapiens
is the only terrestrial personal spec
ies, this is a contingent fact.
Per
sonal capacities, and the entailed
transformation of experience, are log
ically attributable to any creature.
The limitation thereof is based upon
empirical fact and circumstance.
If
we were to discover that chimps or
dolphins could be educated to person
hood, our moral stance toward them
would and should be radically trans
formed. So too if we were to encoun
ter
an
extra-terrestrial
person.
I ndeed, if recent experiments with
"ape language" are as significant as
some claim then a reassessment of ou r
moral stance toward these cousins is
overdue.
I nan effective defen se of human
rights, Regan points out that:
"The
world
contains
individuals
(e.g.,
human beings) who not only are alive
but have a life; these individuals are
not mere things (objects), they are
the subjects of a life; they have, in
James Rachels' helpful phrase, autob
iographies."
(70, cf. 94, 135)
Pre
dictably, he then attempts to extend
this argument to animals. 9
It won't
do.
While some non-personal animals
may be said to "have a life," being
without time- a nd self-consciousness
they can scarcely be said to have
"autobiographies."
Given these di
mensions of consciousness in personal
life, the significance of one's life to
oneself is utterly transformed.
A
steer does not look upon its scheduled
slaughter with the sense of dread and
foreboding suffered by a condemned
prisoner.
"Capital punishment" for
beasts simply makes no sense (as
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Regan himself tacitly admits, 150-2).
To a person, 'a life-his life-is a conti
nuity and a unity. This phenomeno
logical fact entails rights to life that
are unique to persons.
Regan asks:
"on what grounds,
precisely, might it be claimed that no
animals can reason, make free choices,
or form a concept of themselves?"
(13)
The answer is richly repre
sented in recent philosophical, lin
guistic and psychological literature:
on the grounds that animals lack
articulate languages-a rejoinder that
Regan has utterly failed to address.
He continues, "what one would want
[to support th is claim] are detai led
analyses of these cooperative concepts
together with
rationally compelling
empirical data and other arguments
that support the view that all non-hu
man animals are deficient in these
respects."
(13)
Again, there are
such arguments,
based upon
wellwel\
known
studies
of
problem-solving
skills with and without language,
studie,s of aphasia, of animaJ behavior,
of ch i Id ren raised without la nguag.e,
of language-using blind-deaf (e.g.,
Helen Keller), and more. In addition,
there is a vast philosophical literature
on the function of language in per
sonality.
Among the prominent con
tributors to this field of study are
Mead, Dewey, Cassirer, Langer, Witt
genstein and Chomsky (to offer only a
small sample). None of the above are
indexed in Regan's book and, after
two careful readings of the book, I
can recall none of them being men
tioned in this regard.
All these
studies, and more, are crucially rele
vant to Regan's arguments and theo
ries.
His failure to face them and
respond critically must seriously com
promise his case.
In summary: Regan's basic strat
egy in his defense of animal rights is.
to
stress
the
simi la rity
between
humans and nonh uman an imals, at the
expense
of
de-emphasizing
and
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perhaps deval ui ng that which sets
humans
apart
from
the
animals;
namely, the moral significance and
dignity of personhood. That, I sub
mit, may be an exorbitant and unac
ceptable
moral
cost-especially
so,
since there are other grounds upon
which to articulate and justify a
human e treatment of animal s.
II

RIGHTS AND "INHERENT VALUES"
Regan has assembled two arguments
in defen se of the rig hts of animal s;
the first (just considered) might be
called "the argument from analogy
with human rights."
The second,
which
appears
late
in the book
(essays 6, 8 and 9) is "the- argument
from inherent value."
If the preced
ing analysis is correct, the first
argument accomplishes too little (for
Regan's purposes, at least).
The
second argument,
I will contend,
accomplishes too much.
With
it,
Regan seems to be argu'ing what might
be called " pan -liberationism;" i. e.,
with this argument it is difficult to
imagine that anything
is without
rights. And if everything has rights,
then, in effect, nothing has.
("That
which denotes everything, qualifies
nothing. tI)
Consider, then, Regan's concept of
"inherent
value."
In
explication
thereof, he writes:
(1) ... if any given being (x)
has inherent value, then x's
having value of this kind is
logically independent of any
other being's
happening to
take an interest in or other
wise valuing x; (2)
x's
having inherent value makes it
improper (a sign of dis.respect)
to treat x as though it had
value
only
as
a
means
... (133) 10
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The bond that Regan ties between
"inherent value" and "rights" could
not be more complete:
"all those
beings (and only those beings) which
have inherent value have rights."
(136, cf 139) (In logical notation:
(x) (IVx ~ Rx) .) Regan's strategy
then becomes clear:
prove (a) the
above "equivalence proposition," and
(b)
that
animals
have
"inherent
value," then it will follow (c) that
animals have rights.
Still more, with
(a) and (b') (the claim that plants,
rivers, etc., have "inherent value"),
it will follow (c') that these natural
entities also have
rights.
Regan
believes that this argument establishes
the foundations for an environmental
ethic.
Why?
Because, says Regan,
"it wou Id seem to be the case that it
is only if [inanimate natural entities]
have value of this kind that we can
develop a genuine ethic of the envi
ronment, as distinct from an ethic for
its use."
(133, Regan's emphasis.
Cf. 167.)

objective properties" (or, if the Lock
ean objects, "property-makers") is
That
such
properties
g ra nted.
include "values" per se seems con
trary to the very logic of the con
cept. 11 Without a n eva Iuato r on the
scene, the "value" is demoted to the
status of a value-neutral property,
"awaiting" evaluation.

Perhaps
the
most
astonishing
aspect of this concept is the fact that
it
is monadic-i.e.,
non-relational.
While most axiologists regard evalua
tion as relational, Regan appa rently
does not. To Regan, values are not
"values for" or "transactions" between
evaluator and evaluated.
They are
simply
independent
and
objective
properties, which we can take or
leave alone.
(199) To some philoso
phers (this writer included), this
claim makes as much sense as the fol
lowing exchange:

The second sentence simply asserts
what is not in dispute; namely, that
ca rs have properties.
It does not
support Regan's contention that some
of these qualities
are "inherently
valuable." Of course these "good
making qualities" (e.g. of cars) exist
independently; but the value of these
qualities is not "independent" of our
taking an interest
in them.
He
writes, fIca rs do not become, say,
comfortable or economica I by becomi ng
the
objects
of
our
interest."
Granted, but the value of being "com
fortable" or "economical" is a matter
which
requires
our attention and
interest. 12
A "good" luxury car is
not economical; and a "good" racing
car is not comfortable.
The charac
teristics are independent, but the
"goodness" of those characteristics
depends upon our interest in these
characteristics.
(Better,
perhaps,
our "appropriate" or "reasoned" inter
est in them.) Continuing:

"This thing is bigger"
"Bigger than what?"
"Nothing in particular, just bigger"
I n other words, the concept of
value,
some
contend,
logically
requires an evaluator;
someone to
whom a property or event matters.
That there are "independent and

The d ifficu Ities with Rega n' s con
cept of "inherent value" might become
clearer if we examine his attempts to
illustrate the notion. First, cars:
[It will not] do to argue that
cars cannot have a good of
thei r own because what cha r
acteristics are good making in
ca rs depends on what ou r
interests are.
For a car has
those cha racteri stics it has,
including those that are good
rna ki ng, quite independently of
our taking an interest in them.
( 177)
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If a good car was produced by
pu rely natu ral means ... that
would not make it any less a
good one.
It would make it an
unusual one ... If we were to
transport a good car from our
world to a world inhabited by
beings who did not have the
interests we have, it would not
cease to be a good ca r, though
it wou Id cease to be va Iued as
one. A good ca r does not lose
its goodness if we lose our
interest in it. (177)
Again, it would be better to say that
the car would not cease to have the
qualities deemed (by us) to be good.
In a word, Regan is once again con
fus in g here certa in properties of an
object with the judgment (of value)
made of those properties.
Shouldn't
we instead say that in this strange
case it would cease to be "a good
ca r," even if its properties were not
altered.
When he writes, above, "a
good ca r does not lose its good ness if
we lose our interest in it, " all this
means is that the car would keep the
properties that we would prize if,
contra the example, we were there to
evaluate it-or, for that matter, the
properties that we now value from our
hypothetical standpoint as hypothetical
observers of this fanciful world
Regan next offers us a floral illus
tration:
A luxuriant gardenia, one with
abundant blossoms and rich,
deep, green foliage is a better
gardenia than one that is so
deformed and stunted that it
puts forth no blossoms at all,
and this is quite independently
of the interests other beings
happen to take in them. (179)
If the
found
noting
cial

flower in question IS to be
in a florist shop, it is worth
that it is an artifact-an artifi
creation,
by
a
botanist,

"assembled" from n~tural (genetic;)
"media," and designed to appeal to
human tastes. As such, the "better"
gardenia must mean "better for us."
We value the blossoms and foliage.
Another plant with less blossoms and
foliage
might
produce
more
pol
len-better for a bee.
Or more
seeds-better for a finch.
It might be
"better for" the gardenia and/or its
species (whatever' that means) if it
were allowed togo to seed and repro
duce! And would this cultivated plant
survive in the wild as well as its wild
relatives?
Probably not.
Does that
mean that it is not, after all, a "bet
ter ga rden ia If? Note that these a Iter
native "evaluations" apply differing
contexts to Regan's reductive analY$is
of the ga rden ia per se.
(A method,
by the way, ill-suited for environmen
tal ethics.)
Without context, it just
makes no sense to talk of something
as blankly "better."
There is still worse ahead.
Sup
pose, as Regan argues, that the
ga rden ia is "good," not to the florist,
or the bee, or the finch, or even the
ecos ystem-b ut just "good, period. "
What, then" is a "bad ga rden ia?" A
bad (or good) anything! How can we
begin to answer such a question,
without placing an evaluator into the
picture, at least hypothetically (thus
deriving, presumably, a "hypothetical
value"). Without an answer to such a
question, or at least a decision proce
dure, the notion of "inherent value"
is
unbounded-it "underlines every
word in the book."
If the concept
lacks bou nds, then everything is
"inherently\ good," and "goodness"
fails to qualify anything at all. "That
which denotes everything, connotes
nothing."
Has Regan an answer to this objec
tion? Consider his final words on the
subject:
"Two questions that I have
not endeavored to answer are:
(a)
what, if anything in general, makes
something inherently good, and (b)
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how can we know, if we can, what
things are inherently good?1l (202)
Unfortunately for Regan's argument,
and his concept of "inherent value,"
these are precisely the questions that
he must answer if we are to make any
sense of what he is sayi ng.
Without
answers to these questions, his theory
has no meaning or justification.
He
has, in effect, declared conceptual
ban kruptcy, by admitting that he is
unprepared to "cash in" his concept
of "inherent value" in the commerce of
practical moral judgment and experi
ence.

the focus.
The whole informs and
validates the part, while the Ilindivid
ual" is but a component in the sys
tem, and the anonymous conveyer of
evolution. The prey has no Il r ight to
life;" it must reclaim title to its own
life in each encounter with its preda
tors and the elements. While the wolf
is the enemy of the deer, it is the
friend of the deer species, which,
through time and a culling of the
-"unfit," the wolf makes ever more
alert and swift. Th us does the pred
ator contribute to the "integrity, sta
bility and beauty of the biotic commu
nity. "

III
III�

Regan admits to bei ng "attracted"
to the "deep ecologyll approach to
envi ronmental ethics.
(208)
But can
he embrace "deep ecology" without
seriously compromising h is views on
animal rights?
I think not. 13
His
primary difficulty follows from his
commitment to a "rights approach" to
moral responsibility to animals.
As
Regan
correctly
perceives,
this
approach "emphasizes the value of
individuals" (96, cf. 70).
Following
Ronald Dworkin, Regan affirms that
"the rights of the individual trump
the goals of the group.
(91)
It
would seem to follow, then, that the
optimum ecosystem, for Regan, would
be that which best secures the rights
of each organism therein.

Consider
some
other
contrasts
between animal rights and "deep ecol
ogy.1l
To the advocate of animal
rights, hunting is wicked; in the con-.
text of the "deep ecological" land
ethic, hunting could be a moral duty,
(e.g., in a region where the preda
tors have been depleted and where,
as a result, the prey have over
stocked the ca rryi ng capacity of thei r
habitat-the Kaibab deer in Northern
Arizona are the classical example).
"Rights
morality"
demands
equal
treatment; "deep ecology" acknowl
edges the survival of the fittest and a
differential sign ificance of species and
individuals to the "integrity" of the
community. 15
Regan's
"rights
approach" is an explicit extension into
nature of a humanistic ethic; "deep
ecology" is an environmental ethic
derived, in large part, from non-phil
osophical, scientific origins. 16

This is not the approach of deep
ecology-not if, (as Regan proposes)
Aldo Leopold is to be a pa radigm of
"deep ecology.
I n what is perhaps
his most widely quoted remark, Leo
pold wrote: "a thing is right when it
tends to p reserve the integ rity, sta
biity and beauty of the biotic commu
n ity.
It is wrong when it tends oth
e rw is e. " 1 4
The re is
nota Ik of
individuals here. "The biotic commu
nity"-the system and the context-is

So attached is Regan to the indivi
dualistic/rights approach that he is
led to suggest that his concept of
"inherent value" is the "only" way to
"develop a genuine ethic of the envi
ronment, as distinct from an ethic for
its use.
(133) I n a word, he sug
gests that by according rights to the
most trivial and detachable bits of
nature, we will gain an environmental
eth ic by agg regation of the pa rts.
It
never seems to occu r to him to ta ke
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the ecological perspective seriously,
thus regarding the "biotic community"
as a whole system, and then deriving
the value of the part from its involve
ment in and contribution to the sys
temic whole. That, of cou rse, is the
way Leopold goes about it.
The basic discord between "animal
rights" and "deep ecology" might be
illustrated by a fanciful case.
Imag
ine a national
park administrator
determined to carry out a wildlife
management pol icy based on Regan r s
principles of "animal rights"?
How
might he best "liberate" the creatures
under h is management and protection?
One might propose that he adopt the
"deep ecological" approach and just
leave the natural processes to their
own cruel devices and let nature take
its terrible toll. After all, Regan will
not fau It the predators for doi ng thei r
thing:
"the lamb can have rights
only against those beings who are
capable of taking the interests of the
lamb into account and trying to deter
mine, on the basis of its interests, as
well as other relevant considerations,
what, morally speaking, ought to be
don e. "
( 18) 1 7
It i s not, howe
howev
v er ,
quite that simple.
For while the
predators
might be excused,
the
hypothetical park administrator may
not be excused for letting this brutal,
if natural, business go on. He can
put a stop to at least some of this
carnage; indeed, because he can, the
deer (and other prey) have a right to
his protection.
How might he bring all this about?
First, in order to fulfill his duty to
minimize needless pain and death, he
would seek to eliminate, as humanely
as possible,
predator species.
It
wouldn't do, of course, to hunt and
kill them; rather, their elimination
would
have
to
be
accomplished
through sterilization.
Perhaps DDT
might be reintroduced into the food
chain, si nce th is seems to dimi n ish the
reproductive ability of birds of prey.
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Carcasses might be laced with contra
ceptive chemicals, and thus predatory
mammals would be eliminated while
avoiding the iniquity of hunting them.
With the predators
removed, it
would then, of course, become neces
sary to remove excess herbivores, to
avoid thei r increase beyond ca rryi ng
capacity and consequent starvation.
Since hunting would be unacceptable,
this control of population might be
accompl ished th rough selective and
pa rtially effective bi rth control meth
ods (again, presumably through the
use of contraceptive chemicals in food,
water, etc.).
Of course, the policy would only
be partially successful.
The elimina
tion of insect predators would be eco
nomically unfeasible, if not in fact
practically impossible.
Presumably,
insectivore birds would also be allowed
to survive. The primary "beneficiar
ies" of this "rights-oriented manage
ment" would be "higher order" herhi
vores.
This would be the policy,
notwithstanding
Regan's
insistence
that all animals have "right to life."
An interesting consequence of this
fanciful exercise is the discovery
that, far from being an "extension" or
a "foundation" of environmental eth
ics,
vegetarianism
and
"animal
rights," unconstrained, run contrary
to fundamental ecological principles.
For one thing, by insisting upon the
"rights" of individual beings to be
spared unnecessary pain, one loses
sight of the species and the ecosys
tem-and the fact that predators, while
"enemies" of individual prey animals,
are "benefactors" of the prey species.
I n general, by focusi ng upon the
i nd ividuals,
"an imal
liberation ists"
give inadequate attention to contexts
and systems-the essential concepts of
the "ecological point of view."
In
short, the "rights approach" can lead
us far astray from Aldo Leopold's
"Land Ethic."
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I'll not go on with a critical task
that has been
superbly performed
elsewhere.
My effort will be success
ful if I have managed to suggest that
Regan's subtitle, "Essays on Animals
Rights
and
Envi ronmental
Eth ics"
tends, by simple conjunction, to paper
over a massive theoretical crack-a rift
that he has not recognized, far less
attempted to repair, in the body of
the book.

persons).
Hence, in an ecosystem
with at best only minimally sentient
life-components
(e. g. ,
an
alpine
la ke), the i nteg rity of the system
would have a higher moral claim than
that of the "interest" of a trout, much
less a dragonfly.
In another system,
containing persons,
individuals may
have valid claims against the "sys
tem" .
Thus

IV
INDIVIDUALISM AND HOLISM:
TOWARD A SYNTHESIS

If the foregoing analyses have been
successful, we have found that indi
vidualism alone fails as a ground for
an integrated environmental ethics.
This failure is most apparent in the
attempt to extend to a II natu re moral
categories
(such
as "rights,"
and
"duties")
which
are'
appropriately
applied within communities of persons.
However, neither can holism stand
alone as a basis for a sound environ
mental ethic.
In this final section, I
would like to suggest (and merely
that),
how
these
contrasting
approaches to environmental
ethics
might be integ rated.
Some holists contend that the com
of an ecosystem have, by
themselves,
no
moral
significance
whatever. 18 That position is extreme
and untenable.
For while we might
agree with Leopold's maxim that "a
th i ng is rig ht when it tends to p re
'serve the integrity,
stability
and
beauty of the biotic community," we
need not assume from this that Leo
pold's maxim is the only test of
"rig htness. "
(I am not awa re that
Leopold makes this claim.) There may
be other, independent, grounds of
"rightness."
For instance, something
may also be. "right" if it enhances the
interests of sentient beings, and still
more "right" if it serves the interests
of cognitive sentient beings (such as

ponents

the

moral
significance of
may
be
perceived
as
increasing
incrementally
along
the
evol utiona ry line of the development of
"sentience." In an environmental eth
ics thus conceived, the feelings of a
mole might be judged to have some,
but very
little, moral
significance
alongside
the
significance
of
the
"integrity, stability and beauty of the
biotic community" of which it is a
part.
However, as neuro-mechanisms
evolve to greater complexity,
and
therefore toward a greater acuteness
to the experience of pleasu re and
pain, individualism (the morality of
"rights") gains moral significance. At
a certain stage of evolution, neural
complexity, and the psychic life that
it supports, reaches a point (perhaps
past the "quantum leap of person
hood") at which individuality rates
very high consideration-often enough
to trump the demands of ecological
communities.
Thus, for example, a
pond or a field might justifiably "give
way" to "development" for a habitat
for homo sapiens).

individuals

Why should this be so? What is it
about complex neu ral (ergo psychic)
life that should afford it this consid
eration? The question is too large to
consider this late in the paper. 19
Briefly, I would suggest ths possibil
ity:
First of all, complex brains sup
port "sheer sentience," which demands
i mmed i ate mo ra I attention. 20
I n add i
tion,
though
less
obviously,
the
brai n-and therefore the mi nd, the
language, the culture, and thus the
"autobiography-of
a
person claims
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significance through its replication of
the "integrity, stability and beauty"
of ecosystems.
Just as there is, in
an ecosystem, an ecology of organ
isms, there is in the life of a person,
an "ecology of mind" featuring com
plex i ntereactions between the person
organism,
its nervous system, -the
natural environment, and the entity
called
"culture"
which
intervenes
between organism and natural envi
ronment.
Most immediate to the mind
of the person-organism is that part of
his culture which is articulated by
meaning in his language, and which
constitutes his "thought-world." This
"thoug ht-world," in tu rn, . is a com
plex system of memories, cognitions,
connations
and
affections.
This
neural elaboration from brain, through
language and community, to self-con
sciousness, culture
and
"thought
world,"
rivals the
complexity
and
i nteg ration of the I ife-commu n ity wh ich
supports it.
If, as Leopold asserts,
"goodness" is grounded in the "integ
rity, stability and beauty" of ecosys
tems, then, by displaying these quali
ties, mi nds too have va I ue. 21
There a re, of cou rse, times when
the values of ecosystems and the val
ues of person-communities appear to
compete-as, similarly, there are con
flicting demands,' well-known to politi
cal scientists and moralists, between
human communities and human individ
uals.
Still, such conflicts of claims
between I ife-commu n ities, h uma n com
munities and human individuals need
not be exclusive and destructive of
each other.
Perhaps the valid limits
of the claims of the individual upon
the community,
and the community
upon the ecosystem,
are exceeded
when these claims th reaten the health
and i nteg rity, even th e ex i sten ce, of
the larger systems which sustain the
claimants.
Ultimately, the notion of a
"competition"
between
holistic
and
individual values may be false; both
might
be subsumed
under a still
broader holistic system which gives
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due notice to the values and claims of
pre-eminently significant parts of the
ecosystem; namely, the dignity, rights
and duties of the personalistic compo
nents of that system. 22
If this sketch indicates a promising
avenue of accomodation between indi
vidualism and holism, it also reveals a
fatal weakness in Regan's individualis
tic approach to envi ronmental eth
ics-namely,
the
failure
of
that
approach to make allowance for the
incremental
moral
significance
of
neural
complexity.
In
particular,
Regan's approach gives no acknowl
edgmentof the moral significance of
the quantum leap which takes place
with the concomitant emergence of
language, culture and personhood.
Notice, now, that this sketch has
made no claim for a higher moral sig
nificance of members of the species
homo sapiens.
That claim has been
applied here to persons-beings poss
essing a type of advanced neural com
pie x i ty w h i c h, i n t urn, sup port s I a n 
guage, self-consciousness and culture.
Any species might conceivably apply
to that Club. It is a contingent fact,
not a logical truth, that only the
species homo sapiens seems able to
pass the entrance examination.
Other
beings have been portrayed in fiction
to be persons (e.g., in the Dr. 000
litle tales and in the "Star Wars"
films), and some beings (e.g., dol
phins, extra-terrestrials, computers)
may yet in fact be fou nd to be per
sons.
So much for the charge of
"speciesism. "23
An uncompromising individualistic
l!rights-approach"
to
environmental
ethics leads to such absurdities as
were portrayed in the "rights-oriented
game management."
Total commitment
to a holistic ethic is radically destruc
tive of the rights and dignity of per
sons and their communities.
Clearly
an accomodation is called for.
I have
suggested a sol ution wh ich may, or

E&A

V/3

72

may not, deserve elaboration and then
survive circumspect analysis.
What
What
ever the fate of th iss uggestion, it" i s
more important that the challenge be
raised to the philosophical community

to scrupulously search for an accomo
accomo
dation and eventual integration" of the
individualistic and holistic dimensions
of envi ronmental eth ics.

Ern est Part rid g e�
University of Colorado
Colorado�

NOTES
lEvelyn Pluhar, "Two Conceptions
of an Environmental Ethic and Their
Implications,
"
Ethics & Animals,
IV:4, (December, 1983), p. 110.
Regan,
All
That
Dwell
2Tom
Therein,
Berkeley:
University of
California Press, 1982, p. 2.
Here
Here
after, all clear references to Regan's
book will be placed in the text.
3Th is characterization of Regan's
position is supported by the following
quotations from the book:
(a)"
because [animals'] interests are fre
fre
quently as important to them as com
com
parable interests are to human beings,
their interests must be given the same
weight as comparable human inter
inter
ests."
(86)
(b)"
attempts to
mark a qualitative chasm that sepa
sepa
rates man
from the
beasts must
fa iI. . . " ( 159)
( c ) " Itis not c Iea r ,
first, that no non-human animals sat
sat
isfy
anyone
(or all) of these
[rights'-conferring]
conditions,
and
second, it is reasonably clear that not
all human beings satisfy them." (28)
4Notably, Joel
Feinberg in
his
essay, "The Rights of Animals and
Unborn Generations," in Blackstone
(ed), Philosophy and Environmental
Crisis, Athens, Georgia:
University
of Georgia Press, 1974.

5Th is is not the place to discuss
the idea that manifestly "unequal"
persons deserve "equal rights." The
literature one the topic is vast, of
cou rse.
The best recent treatments,
in my opinion, are by Ronald Dworkin
and John Rawls.
6Regan's
indexed
references
to
"persons" (152-3, 156) deal exclu
exclu
sively with "person" as a legal con
con
cept-i. e.,
entities
with
juridical
standing. He makes little use of the
concept of "person" as an integrated
and continuous set of capacities.
7Some
7S
ome researchers claim that some
experimental apes have broken this
barrier
(e. g.,
the
Gardiner's
"Washoe"
and
Paterson's
"Koko").
Still others, (e.g., John Lilly) believe
that dolphins may be "persons" with
an articulate language.
If so, and if
this can be demonstrated, then these
animals are welcome to the club (i. e.,
to our
"moral community").
The
issue, however, is in doubt, to say
the least.
(Cf. Herbert Terrace's
work with "Nim Chimsky".)
8By (a) "significant" is meant that
symbol,
"x",
evokes
the
same
response (or image) in all parties to
the communication.
Other criteria of
language are (b) syntactical (gram
(gram
matical), (c) conventional, and (d)
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arbitrary. Cf. Fromkin and Rodman,
An I ntroduction to Language, (New
York:
Holt,
Rinehart & Winston,
1983), C h. 1.
9This, however,
is not Regan's
sole criterion of "rights." He further
contends that ina n imate bei ngs nave
"rights,"
due
to their
"inherent
va Iu,e. "
(Clea rly pia nts, rocks and
rivers do not "have autobiographies. ")
More about this shortly.
l°There is a third feature, of
which Regan admits in a footnote, "I
am myself confused about th is pa rt"
(146); a confusion that I share, and
thus will spare the reader.
11But to say that projects, objects
and events contain "value-makers" (or
"value-gens," to use Holmes Rolston's
felicitous term) may be quite accepta
ble, in that such a notion entails a
relation with an evaluator.
For an
expanded treatment of the ideas in
th is
section,
see
my "Va lues
in
Nature:
Is Anybody there?", pre
sented at a conference at the Un iver
sity of Georgia, "Environmental Eth
ics: New Directions," October 5, 1984
[in circulation- publication virtually
assured].
The following three [ms]
pages are shared with that paper.
12Because I don't necessarily wish
to embrace an interest theory of value
here, I would say that "attention and
interest" are necessary for value,
though not sufficient.
Otherwise, we
are perilously close to subjectivism
and relativism.
13My statement of the final objec
tion will be brief, since I am quite
unable to improve upon Baird Calli
cott's superb presentation of the same
objection in "Animal Liberation:
A
Triangular
Affair"
(Environmental
Ethics, 2:4 (Winter, 1980). Callicott's
article is twice cited, but never ans
wered,
by
Regan
in
this
book.
Another excellent treatment of this
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issue is Mark Sagoff's "Animal Libera
tion and Environmental Ethics:
Bad
Marriage, Quick Divorce" Osgoode Hall
Law Journal, 22:2 (Summer, 1984).
Thoug h inclose ag reement to those of
Callicott and Sagoff, my views on this
issue were arrived at independently.
14Aldo Leopold, A Sand County
Almanac, (New York: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1949), 224-5. Regan does
not cite this passage.
lsCallicott,327.
16 Ibid, 321 f .
17Regan, who is so anxious to dis
count the differences between humans
and animals, fails to notice that the
very qualities
that
make a
man
responsible, and a wolf not responsi
ble, are the qualities which make
human life much more valuable, and
human rights much more urgent, than
those of animals without these quali
ties.
18Pluhar, p. 120-3, so character
izes holism, and in defense of this
characterization, cites Callicott, op.
cit., 332.
19 1 examine this question more
deeply in my "Values in Nature," op.
cit., and in "Nature as a Moral
Resou rce, " Environmental Ethics, 6,
(Summer, 1984).
2°"Sheer sentience," as a factor in
moral significance, may be at "moral
bedrock."
The best expression, to
my knowledge, of this "Cartesian cer
tainty" of the evil of pain, is from
Charles
Schulz'
"Linus":
Lucy:
"Well , why is pa i n bad? "
Li n us :
"Because pain hurts!"
Beyond this,
I'm not sure what more can, or need,
be said. To know pain is to know it's
prima facie bad (whatever the possibly
over-riding good results may be).
Cf. Feinberg on the Interest Princi
ple, in "Rights of Animals and Unborn
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Generations,"
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in

Blackstone

(ed),

Philosophy and Environmental Crisis,
Athens, Georgia: University of Geor
Georgia Press, 1974. Also see my "Envi
"Environmental
Ethics:
Obstacles
and
Opportunities,"
in
Schultz
and
Hughes, (eds), Ecological Conscious
Consciousness, Washington,
DC:
University
Press of America, 1981.
21As a necessary condition for the
sustenance of communities of persons,·
the natural system may also be said to
"draw" significance from the signifi
significance of personhood.
According to
the anth ropocentric view, the ecosys
ecosystem draws all of its significance ther
therefrom.

22Let us not forget that the very
concept of
"morality"
presupposes
personhood:
persons are the only
beings that can be said to have
duties,
or
can
be
meaningfully
"guilty" or "ashamed" of a violation of
moral principles.
23 Analogously,
with
considerable
imagination,
one
might
imagine
"super-persons" (e.g., able to settle
communal disputes without resort to
threats of mutual annihilation,
or
capable of selecting communal leaders
on the basis of intelligence and abil
ability, rather than property, power or
charm).
Such beings might then
exceed "persons" in moral signifi
significance.

